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JUDGE'S ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON CFJ 3381 or, what logic do the rules follow anyway?
So, Fool's scam (in which e claims to have deregistered everyone else, obtaining a dictatorship via being the only person capable of voting) is really dominating the discussion recently (and for good reason; the lack of certainty about what happened makes it hard to do anything else), and this is the first CFJ that really depends on the success or failure of the scam (the only reasons why omd would possibly not be a player are if Fool's scam fully succeeded, or in the very unlikely event that Wooble's theory that the entire playerlist was emptied years ago and Fool was never a player is correct, and we've taken corrective action for Wooble's version of events recently, just in case; I'm not going to consider that theory here because it would detract from the main arguments). As such, I'd like to preserve a description of the events behind the scam, and the arguments being presented, for historical impact; it's possible to read some of it from the list archives, but that's always a frustrating form from which to look over the historical events of the past. This means, necessarily, that my arguments and evidence are going to be mixed together and not neatly separated; this is a minor breach of a recommendation in rule 2205/4 (which recommends I separately label the arguments and the evidence), but I consider the aim of producing a usable historical record more important than that recommendation, and as it's only a recommendation I can ignore it if I have a good reason.
First, though, I'd like to talk about the role of a judge in such matters. There are four ways that I could judge this CFJ, and remain within the requirement of my Rules duties as a judge:
I could just rule TRUE on the basis that if omd is not a player, then neither am I, and thus if tthe judgement is validly made, it cannot possibly be incorrect. This complies with the letter of all the relevant rules, but would fail to solve any of the underlying problems, and as such would be unsatisfactory. Agora looks to judges to resolve controversies; and even if it turns out that I'm not a player and can't give the judgement, the important part of the judgement – the reasoning – will still be available and settle matters.
I could check to see if the scam had succeeded at least as far as the purported deregistration, ignoring everything that happened after that. (For instance, as will be seen later, it's possible to make a reasonable argument that the scam currently prevents reregistration, but did not allow the purported deregistration to occur.) This would solve the individual question asked in the status of the CFJ – whether omd is a player – but still leave a lot of ambiguity (for instance, as to whether teucer, who registered recently, is a player). This is what I'm going to focus on first, and is also what will guide the actual final verdict (because the statement of the CFJ, "I am a player" by omd, is inquiring into whether the scam deregistered omd in particular, not whether it at least partially worked in general, not whether it could have worked if corrected).
I could look over the specific details of how the scam happened, aiming to poke holes in them; it wouldn't be the first time that a scam had failed due to minor errors by its perpetrator, or even minor errors by someone unrelated (the Threat Trombones scam back in 1998 failed because the Promotor made a typo, for instance). This does not solve the underlying problems, in that varying the details could cause different outcomes. However, it does serve a very useful purpose for Agora as a whole; a gamestate change as major as deregistering most of the players and gaining a dictatorship causes a /huge/ amount of uncertainty as to what the true gamestate is, and discovering that this particular instance of it failed would clean up the uncertainty (if not, perhaps, potentially invite more damage due to players attempting to repeat the scam; this would likely be considered very bad form, but a dictatorship might be a large enough prize that players would try it anyway). I'll consider this after considering the question of whether omd is a player, because it's important to know which gamestate we're in.
I could rule about the underlying logical principles behind the scam. This judgement is less important in the sense of determining what the true gamestate is (something that I've repeatedly admitted is my highest priority right now, especially because the rules that would normally fix an uncertain gamestate for us are broken for reasons unrelated to the scam), but many players are interested in knowing what the answer is. I'll cover this later, after I cover whether Fool's attempt at the scam worked or not.
I'm going to ignore option 1 as it's a total cop-out, and consider 2, 3, and 4 in turn.
So first, a summary of what happened.
First, there were a few relevant proposals in the distribution of proposals numbered 7530-7547 (whose voting period ended around the same time the scam happened, and which thus had to be created first, over a week before the scam itself); the most relevant ones are:
7535 by omd, which (if passed) would repeal rule 101 (a rule both most aspirational, and which also contains many anti-scam restrictions, some of which are definitely relevant here); 7537 by Fool, which uncontroversially gives em a dictatorship if it passes (the proposal has AI 3 and the rule it creates Power 3, sufficiently high for em to use eir dictatorship rule to perform any action); 7541 by Fool, which fixed a bug in the definition of Parties (which might incidentally have been used as a method to counterscam, although it's unlikely such a counterscam could have succeeded).
The timing of proposal 7535 appears to have been entirely coincidental, although fortunate for Fool's purposes. Interestingly, proposal 7537 contained the following footnote, which is a little chilling in retrospect:
[ Same as failed prop 7494, but removed the controversial clause "Fool SHALL respect the long tradition of players relinquishing the dictatorship after a time and not actually abusing it." I expect this will pass now. ]
The main part of the scam came in a few messages after that. First, Fool created two Promises, quoted in full here because they're so key to the case:
Title: Paraconsistency is overrated, part 1 Text: I transfer 1 Yak to the casher Cashing condition: Casher is a first-class player. Destruction by author condition: The promise titled "Paraconsistency is overrated, part 2" CAN be destroyed by its author with notice.
Title: Paraconsistency is overrated, part 2 Text: I transfer 1 Yak to the casher Cashing condition: Casher is a first-class player. Destruction by author condition: IF the promise titled "Paraconsistency is overrated, part 1" CAN be destroyed by its author with notice, THEN: - the author of this promise CAN de-register all first-class players other than himself by announcement; AND - persons other than the author of this promise CAN NOT register.
In the same message, e took two further steps: giving notice that e intended to destroy the promises (which, if the destruction by author conditions are met, allows a promise to be destroyed between 4 and 14 days after the intent is given), and attempting to deregister every first-class player other than emself. (Second-class players are rare in Agora at the moment, and it's likely none of them can take any actions; the Best Party is the only second-class player that claimed to be able to take actions, but I think Agora as a whole did not believe that claim. At any rate, it hasn't tried.) Note that under Agoran law, it's possible to submit intent to perform an action, even if you don't actually plan to perform it in the future; there's no current rule against lying, and the intent is successful even if it's not the truth when performed.
In eir next message, e purported to resolve the proposals, claiming that eir own voting limit was 4 and everyone else's was 0, meaning that each proposal passed or failed according to eir own vote. E voted FOR each of the above proposals (7535, 7537, 7541).
And later that day, e sent one further message, purporting to use the dictatorship rule created via proposal 7537 to allow nonplayers to create proposals, prevent all other players registering, and destroy all Parties with no members (which would only affect the Best Party in any gamestate that I've heard mentioned as potentially correct).
So, about this specific scam attempt. Before coming to the main point (the interaction of the promises themselves), I'm going to talk about the proposals Fool attempted to force through. Fool made the following argument on the discussion forum: "See the recent TIME OUT scam... making someone not an eligible voter does set their voting limit to 0." However, e seems to have missed the way that voting limits work in Agora. An excerpt from Rule 683/17 gives us the basic definition: } So as Fool points out, ineligible voters have a voting limit of 0, and eligible voters have a voting limit that defaults to 2, but can be modified. However, what about the purportedly deregistered players? We have rule 1950/28 for that: } In other words, even if you deregister everyone, they're still eligible voters on proposals that were pending at the time (because decisions to adopt proposals have an adoption index). So their voting limit isn't forced to 0 after all. (The recent TIME OUT scam, which made players inactive, likewise doesn't actually work on vote resolution, for this reason; however, it would have worked on proposal /distribution/, back before the loophole was patched.)
If it isn't forced to 0, what is it? The decision in question were all Ordinary, which gives us this definition, from rule 2389/8 (which was the rule in force at the time of the scam; it's since been amended): } So, for players, we have a defined voting limit in rule 2389; they have a VVLOP, and that's their voting limit. For nonplayers, rule 2389 has trouble defining a voting limit; as a player switch, VVLOP isn't a meaningful concept for nonplayers. There are only two reasonable ways to interpret rules 683/17 and 2389/8 in this circumstance: that because an eligible nonplayer doesn't have a VVLOP, they don't have a voting limit, and thus have infinitely many votes; or because they don't have a VVLOP, rule 2389 fails to set a voting limit, so it defaults to the definition of 2 in rule 683. The second interpretation seems a lot more reasonable, because we have a high-powered rule (683, at 3) strongly implying that voting limits have to exist and are numbers, and because both game custom and past judgements imply that values tend to be at their defaults if there's no other reasonable value they could have (e.g. CFJ 3254, where a ruble was transferred back and forth infinitely many times and ended up in the Lost & Found Department, even though nobody had tried to transfer it there). As such, there is no gamestate in which Fool's attempts to force proposals through passed, because rule 208/10 requires a tally of ballots: } and there is no reasoning via which the tally in Fool's purported resolution is correct.
Probably the most noticeable effect of this is that none of Fool's attempted actions matter, apart from the initial message; without a dictatorship, e can't use it to do anything. Additionally, rule 101/14's protection against unannounced Rule Changes is therefore very much in force: }
With the uncertainty about the ruleset cleared up, I turn to the subject of the uncertainty about the player list, and this impacts at the heart of Fool's scam. The argument is a logical one; people have suggested various different logics for evaluating things, but I'll restrict myself to good old-fashioned classical logic (in which a contradiction implies anything) to see whether the scam works even with the most favourable interpretation. Here's Fool's argument as to why it works: }
The relevant parts of rules are this excerpt from 2337/7: } and this excerpt from rule 2125/7: } (Both rules have a power of 3, giving them effectively total power over any part of the gamestate except when there's an outright contradiction between one rule and another.)
However, there's been something of a deceit here. Fool has hidden various complex statements inside eir variables X, Y, and Z. First, I want to focus on the phrase "CAN destroy that promise with notice", because performing an action with notice is something well defined in the rules (here, 1728/32): } This is a "dependent action"; you can destroy something by announcement, if a) a rule purports to allow you to destroy it with notice; b) you gave intent at least 4 (and at most 14) days earlier.
So how, from a strictly logical point of view, do we parse the statement "the promise X CAN be destroyed by its author with notice"? The definition in rule 1728 only technically applies to rules, but if we make the reasonable expansion that it applies to promise conditions, too, we get "the promise X can be destroyed by its author with announcement, if e announced intent between 4 and 14 days earlier" (the Speed is Normal at the moment). This backwards definition of dependent actions takes a little getting used to, but not only does it follow from the letter of the rules, it is also game custom ("I intend to do X with Notice" ... wait 4 days ... "with Notice, I do X"). The only other expanded definition that seems plausible is the one that Fool presumably intended, "If promise X's author announces intent to destroy it with Notice, e will be able to destroy it between 4 and 14 days later". The second interpretation is only amenable to a subjunctive definition of "if"; the first interpretation could use either a subjunctive or indicative (i.e. strictly logical) definition of "if", which gives us three potential interpretations for the chaos hiding inside Fool's "Sentence A" (the destruction condition of eir first promise): 1. (first interpretation, logical) At least one of the following statements is true: a) the author of the promise titled "Paraconsistency is overrated, part 2" did not give intent to do so between 4 and 14 days earlier; b) e can destroy that promise by announcement; 2. (second interpretation, subjunctive) If the author of the promise titled "Paraconsistency is overrated, part 2" gives intent to do so now, e will be able to destroy it by announcement between 4 and 14 days in the future; 3. (first interpretation, subjunctive) If the author of the promise titled "Paraconsistency is overrated, part 2" had given intent to do so between 4 and 14 days earlier, then e would be able to destroy it by announcement right now.
With the strictly logical point of view in 1., it is clear that at the time Fool attempted to use the scam to deregister players, it simply wasn't true that the intent had been given, and thus sentence A is simply uncontroversially true (and sentence B uncontroversially false). As such, the scam fails with this interpretation.
With the hypothetical in 2., we get time travel problems. In general, a statement about things that will happen in the future is something that can't meaningfully be considered to be necessarily true or false at any point in time in Agora, because of the risk that the rules are amended out from underneath it, and in particular, conditionals that talk about future events are considered to be too ambiguous to be satisfied. (See, for instance, CFJ 2926.) In this particular case, the risk of rules being amended out from underneath the loop is very high; often it's possible to at least make an argument about there being insufficient time to pass a proposal or ratify a document, but in the case of a dictatorship scam, whose entire purpose is to allow persons to perform arbitrary actions, there's definitely a possibility that whether the future conditional is true or false will affect actions in the future, i.e. a time paradox. It would be uncontroversial that even an author destruction condition as simple as "The day after the promise is destroyed, its author posts 'CREAMPUFF' to a public forum" is not satisfiable; the condition's truth or falsity cannot be determined at the time at which it would have to be true. Besides, the promises might be destroyed by other means in the meantime (if you don't have a dictatorship, then you can't deregister other players, meaning that attempts to cash the promises in question will succeed and destroy them).
This brings us to expansion 3. The precedents are quite poor on whether this sort of subjunctive conditional that talks about past conditions that don't actually exist can work, but given that subjunctives are the subject of CFJs all the time, it seems reasonable that the general principle is valid. However, it has another issue: the intent to destroy the promise would have to be before the promise's actual creation, in order for the condition loop to exist in time for Fool's attempt to deregister everyone to work. The relevant precedent is CFJ 2927, but it's a poor precedent (not only are the arguments perfunctory and hard to make sense of, they also don't match the judgement). It does seem clear, though, that the promise would have to be clearly identified in order to make an intent to destroy it (and even that might not be enough); identifying a nonexistent promise merely via its title is impossible (at least in part because someone could create another promise with the same title), and if the promise were identified via its text and conditions then it seems likely that players would attempt a counterscam (e.g. restarting the Gerontocracy so as to be able to object to the destruction). Besides, this sort of subjunctive, which doesn't specify full details of the past action, doesn't evaluate as true merely for there being some way to make the intent that would cause the destruction to work; it only evaluates to true if all methods of making the intent would cause the destruction to work, and that's clearly false. So with this point of view, sentence A is definitely false, and sentence B true, again without worrying about Z.
In other words, during the 4 days after Fool created eir promises, they didn't cause any sort of logical loop or the like. Because eir mass deregistration is pragmatic, rather than platonic (e has to specifically announce that e deregisters players), and e didn't make such an announcement after the 4 days had passed, it failed, and we're all still players. (One of the things I did to prevent em fixing the scam in response to this judgement was to cash eir promises, destroying them and thus preventing them from being destroyed by their author in the future; Fool will need a new intent in order to restart the scam, likely giving us 4 days and some new leeway to counterscam.)
Now, this solves the issue of whether or not omd is a player (e is; at the time Fool attempted to deregister em, e definitely couldn't), allowing me to judge this CFJ TRUE, but it doesn't resolve the question of whether the scam nonetheless worked (just with a 4 day delay while the intents worked themselves out). With expansion 1. or 3. above, we don't have any temporal problems due to the use of "CAN ... with notice", because the notice was actually given (Fool believed this to be irrelevant, but e's wrong). However, there are other potential holes here. Let's quote Fool's argument again, as a reminder: }
I've been focusing on X and Y, but this time I want to focus on something that Fool was taking for granted; the security restrictions on the various actions involved. Here's the security restriction in 869/33 (which secures things at power 2 by default): } and from 2337/7, the (power-3) rule being scammed:
Now, let me expand this logical argument, in the same style as Fool's, but adding rule 869, and making the security restrictions explicit: }
Now, Fool is arguing that the rule 2337 loop is sufficiently powerful to imply a mechanism for deregistering players into rule 2337. This takes a bit of a split personality viewpoint on the rules; first the argument is that "rule 2337 says that promises can't be destroyed except as written in the rules, and there are no other rules that allow destruction of promises in another entity's possession, thus the biconditional is a true biconditional not a one-way conditional" (i.e. assuming outright that any rules that don't specify a mechanism for destroying promises can't destroy promises), and then later, "because the biconditionals imply that rule 2337 allows deregistration of players, it gets around the security in rule 869, being of a high enough power to imply a new mechanism into the rules" (assuming that even if a rule doesn't specify a mechanism for deregistering players, it can deregister players).
However, this argument is just as easily reversed. Rule 869 says (via securing citizenship at 2, and the fact that there are no other rules that allow a player to deregister another by announcement except as the result of dependent actions that aren't satisfied) that players can't (with the current set of intents, at least) deregister other players by announcement. As such, if we follow the logic of the promise loop, we find that there must be a mechanism to destroy promises other than the one in rule 2337; any other situation would lead to a contradiction. Fortuitously, rule 869, with its power of 2, happens to be sufficiently powerful to get around the security restriction on promises.
So, following Fool's argument, we find that rule 2337 has a secret, unwritten ability to block registrations and allow Fool to deregister other players. But, there's another possibility using the same sort of reasoning: instead of rule 2337 being able to deregister players and block registrations, it's possible for rule 869 to allow Fool to destroy eir own promises.
If we assume that these are the only possibilities, we quickly find that the second possibility, which implies a mechanism to destroy promises into rule 869, is less absurd, because it doesn't cause a contradiction between rules. Adding a new mechanism to deregister players is "fine" in that it creates no contradictions with any rule. However, blocking the registration of players would cause an outright contradiction between 2337 and 869, because there's also the following paragraph of rule 869/33: } Sure, there's an "unless" clause that would mean no contradiction if rule 2337 outright stated "Players other than Fool CAN NOT register". But there's an "explicitly" in there, and I don't think anyone can seriously argue that rule 2337 /explicitly/ prevents any players from registering.
At this point, it's clearly been established that Fool's promises don't do anything useful, interacting outside themselves; if they do anything at all, it's to allow Fool to destroy them when e otherwise would be unable to do so. However, this doesn't solve the problem of whether this sort of scam could work in general, if the other problems could be avoided (e.g. if promises were destructible by announcement rather than with notice so that there were no time travel issues, and if Fool were attempting to imply a mechanism to interfere with gamestate secured by a rule with power below 2, so that the interpretation of the other rules allowing destruction of Promises logically failed).
(As an aside, it's also worth talking about the counterscam attempts along similar lines to Fool's, which used different statements, in order to clarify the gamestate. Teucer's counterscam attempted to allow em to repeal rules as its Z, which rams into both rule 101's prevention of unannounced Rule Changes and rule 105's mindbogglingly high level of security on rule changes, and also has the notice problem because I cashed the promises before the notice period could run out; mine, which prevents the creation Promises and allows me to change their conditions, has the notice problem only partially, because I actually got the 4 days of notice, but otherwise has the same problems as Fool's, because rule 2337 would self-contradict if it's forcing Z to possible and not X or Y to true. As such, I conclude that none of the counterscam attempts did anything either in terms of counterscamming, although Teucer's was mostly a paradox attempt and I'm not opining on whether there's an actual paradox there or not.)
Still, we have a bit of a problem in general here. Following the reasoning so far, we can conclude that the scam implies that either it's possible for Fool to destroy the "part 1" promise even if its author destruction condition is true, or that it's possible for Fool to destroy the "part 2" promise even if its author destruction condition is true, or both. Rules normally logically collapse to something along the lines of "X is possible AND Y is possible", but a rule that logically expands to the form "X is possible OR Y is possible" is not the sort of thing that players enact intentionally, because it leaves it very unclear as to whether either of the actions is possible. In general, this seems to indicate a problem with interpreting rules as logical expressions; the nature of a rule isn't that of a logical expression, because there are logical expressions that simply don't translate to rule form.
Even if you believe that Fool's scam worked entirely and my above analysis on rule 869 is incorrect, it's still possible to draw absurdities in general from this sort of scam, as we could substitute any statement we wanted for Z, under Fool's reasoning. Time travel paradoxes? Sure! What about a payload of the form "Either Fool can deregister arbitrary players by announcement, or Fool can transfer Yaks from arbitrary players to emself by announcement, but not both"? What's a player trying to determine whether an action succeeded meant to make of that (especially if e tries to take both actions)? There's clearly something wrong with the kind of logical argument that lets you conclude that one of a set of actions is possible, but without any knowledge as to which.
The fundamental misunderstanding here, then, is to do with what it means for a rule to prevent or permit something. If a rule permits a specific action X via a specific mechanism Y, is that equivalent to saying that the statement "A player CAN perform action X via mechanism Y" is true? I'd argue that the answer here is "no". Consider the following hypothetical rules: }
From a strictly logical point of view, the first hypothetical rule can be read as (X AND Y), where X is the ability to create our hypothetical assets, and Y is the ability to destroy them. The second hypothetical rule can likewise be read as (NOT Y). Clearly, there's a contradiction here; and clearly, we'd resolve it as (X AND NOT Y) because higher-power rules take precedence. From our strictly logical point of view, though, we can't do that; if Y is false, then (X AND Y) is also false regardless of the value of X, so there's no particular reason to conclude X to be true. However, I think everyone would conclude players to be able to create the hypothetical assets in this situation. This is a big clue that Agora isn't interpreting the rules as logical statements.
So how are the rules being interpreted, then, if not from a logical viewpoint? I'd argue that they're defining elements of gamestate, or permitting/preventing/mandating/prohibiting actions, under certain conditions. This gives us a clear way to resolve precedence problems like the above; the two hypothetical rules conflict because one tries to permit asset destruction and the other tries to prevent it, but there's no conflict as to whether the asset creation is allowed. Likewise, the plain language of rule 2337 permits destruction of promises under certain circumstances, and the scam promises are simply just a circular definition, just as much as "Author destruction condition: The author of this promise CANNOT destroy it by announcement" would be a circular definition. In a way, saying "action X is possible" as a promise condition is just a form of shorthand, for a logical expression combined out of all the conditions on rules that would permit or prevent action X, and the problem with promise loops like these is that the condition cannot be expanded, because it leads to an infinite regress. (Agora always has had a custom that shorthand that would expand to an infinite statement is not allowed.)
Even with a more logical view of conditions, the interpretation of rule 2337 as being "first, evaluate this condition; then, based on its truth value, determine whether the destruction is allowed or not" completely sidesteps the scam. You just end up with a straightforward UNDECIDABLE evaluating the actual condition (which leads to a FALSE when determining whether the destruction can be performed). The operation of the condition itself has to be separated from that of the rule, just like the multiple clauses of a rule have to be separated from each other; the two cannot be merged into one statement, because then it'd be impossible to resolve precedence wars between rules in any sort of sensible way. (And besides, what is a power-0 condition doing trying to affect the operation of a power-3 rule, anyway? It should go make its own mind up whether it's true, false, or undecidable. What it can't do is imply text into the rule to make itself more decidable.)
In the case of Fool's scam, we can create a version of eir argument more accurate to the way the rules work like this: } If we attempt to evaluate the truth value of sentence A, for instance, we determine that it's undecidable; Z1 is not permitted and Z2 is not prevented, so it collapses into an Epimenides paradox. Z1 and Z2 have no reason to suddenly become permitted and prevented respectively in order to resolve the paradox, because there's no Magical Paradox Prevention Fairy trying to imply clauses into the rules in order to avoid paradoxes. No rule permits Z1 (and at least one rule, 869, prevents it), so it's disallowed, in just the same way as no rule permitting X means that X is disallowed.
Or to put the fundamental flaw in this scam into sharp relief: the scam only appears to work in paraconsistent logic because Fool carefully (perhaps unintentionally) hid the parts of the reasoning that would fall down under it. (In particular, reading about paraconsistent logic, the mistake appears to have been interpreting "If a promise has one or more conditions [...] then the author CAN [...]" as a logical if/then; in paraconsistent logic, this phrasing doesn't translate to "Either the conditions are false, or the rule permits...", but rather to "Either the conditions are false, or the conditions are undecidable, or the rule permits...") We can't decide that Z must be true because it'd cause A and B to become undecidable otherwise; instead, we note that Z is false, and A and B are undecidable as a result. Fool ignores this line of argument entirely by assuming that there's a phantom IFF there right at the start of eir argument!
In general, though, even ignoring paraconsistency, there is clearly something wrong with a purely logical style of reasoning that merges all the rules and conditions together first and then looks for paradoxes later. You can't meaningfully evaluate precedence under such circumstances; if multiple rules are involved in your paradox, you can end up with actions being permitted when there's no obvious rule to permit them; you can end up with rules that permit one action or another, but you don't know which. The fact that you can produce Curry's Paradox using this style of reasoning is relatively unimportant, given that you can create much more absurd situations. Far better, then, to look at what the rules imply first, and evaluate your conditions later. Even if they're undecidable by then.
(As a side note, I was planning to hold off judging this until the 4-day intent period had passed on my own counterscam promises; the idea would be that with the reasoning that lead to Fool's promises working, mine would too, and I could thus use them to combat the scam with no risk of interference. Given that I'm pretty certain that the counterscam fails for the same reason the original scam did, though, I see no reason to wait.)
Summary of conclusions that apply regardless of the logical principles behind Agora, for people trying to reconstruct the gamestate and who don't want to read that wall of text: - Fool's scam failed to deregister anyone - Fool's scam failed to prevent anyone registering - Fool's dictatorship rule never passed, and wouldn't have passed even if the scam had succeeded in deregistering eveyone - My counterscam failed (except inasmuch as I cashed Fool's promises); - Teucer's counterscam failed to allow em to repeal rules (no opinion on whether it's a paradox) - and the statement of the CFJ is TRUE.